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Abstract 
 
During the ﬁnal years of the Multiﬁber Agreement the US imposed strict import quotas on 
Chinese apparel while it gave African apparel duty- and quota-free access. The combination of these 
policies led to a rapid but ephemeral rise of African exports. In this paper we argue that the 
African success can be explained by a temporary transhipment of Chinese apparel driven by 
quota-hopping Chinese assembly ﬁrms. We ﬁrst provide a large body of anecdotal evidence on the 
Chinese apparel wave in African countries. Second, we show that Chinese apparel exports to 
African countries predict US imports from the same countries and in the same apparel categories 
but only where transhipment incentives are present, i.e. for products with binding quotas in the 
US and for countries with preferential access to the US unconstrained by rules of origin. Using input-
output linkages, we then show that African countries imported quasi-ﬁnished products with little 
assembly work left to do, rather than primary textile inputs. We estimate that direct transhipment 
may account for around half of AGOA countries apparel exports. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which enabled African countries to 
export over 4,000 products, including hundreds of apparel products, quota-free and duty-free to 
the US, has been the object of much economic research. Collier and Venables (2007) and Frazer 
and Biesebroeck (2010) both ﬁnd that the AGOA trade preferences had a positive and 
signiﬁcant impact on exports from Africa to the US. Yet the rapid rise of African apparel 
exports to the US has not survived the demise of the Multiﬁber Agreement (MFA) in 2005 (Fig. 
1, top panel), when Chinese exports took over (Harrigan and Barrows, 2009), and has not been 
accompanied by dynamic growth beneﬁts (Edwards and Lawrence, 2010). 
In this paper we argue the success was rapid but short-lived as a large share of AGOA exports 
were in fact Chinese exports aimed for the US but transhipped through AGOA countries, with 
little assembly work done in Africa. We argue the transhipment was induced by a combination 
of two coinciding policy regimes, i.e. the AGOA and the MFA.1 As pointed out by Brambilla et al. 
(2010), the quotas imposed on Chinese exports during the MFA regime guaranteed smaller 
developing countries access to the US market. This implicit export subsidy for African countries, 
coupled with AGOA preferences, was thus a golden opportunity for African apparel exporters. 
Yet, as highlighted by Collier and Venables (2007), a key feature of the AGOA preferences was 
the absence of rules of origin (ROOs), which are usually imposed under trade agreements to avoid 
transhipment. This “loophole” in AGOA rules thus provided an opportunity for Chinese exporters 
to merely tranship their products via “screwdriver plants” in AGOA, avoiding MFA quotas 
and on top beneﬁtting from AGOA preferences. On the contrary, ROOs were duly imposed by 
the EU, and this explains why US imports from AGOA countries started booming in 2001 
while the EU’s did not (Fig. 1).  The end of the system of quotas on Chinese exports 
rendered the transhipment unnecessary and thus led to the departure of footloose factories and the 
fall of AGOA exports. 
 
1As is customary, we use “MFA” to refer to its continuation, the Agreement on Textile and Clothing (1995-
2004). 
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The suspicion that AGOA and MFA policies spurred a Chinese textile manufacturing wave in 
Africa has been documented by a recent literature as well as news reports. According to 
Naumann (2008), Chinese and Taiwanese producers formed the bulk of a textile “diaspora” in 
Lesotho, Madagascar, and Kenya, which have seen a revival of their sectors owing to these foreign 
investments. Taiwan-Economic-News (2005) reports that 30 Taiwanese textile factories have 
stampeded to establish footholds in Africa, mainly in Lesotho and Swaziland. Rolfe and 
Woodward (2005) ﬁnd that in the Kenyan Export Processing Zone, 80% of the 34 garment 
plants had Asian owners. Gibbon (2003) writes that in Madagascar in 2002, Far Eastern-owned 
ﬁrms accounted for 30% of employment. 
Moreover, the literature has highlighted the role played by the MFA quotas imposed by the 
US on Chinese apparel on top of AGOA’s role in the export sucess. Traub-Merz (2006) and 
Zafar (2007) note that Chinese factories in several African countries had been set up to take 
advantage of easy African access to the US market under AGOA and that exports have been 
concentrated in formerly quota-restrained products, such as basic trousers, t-shirts, and sweaters. 
Rolfe and Woodward (2005) observe that 99% of exports from the ﬁve most AGOA-successful 
countries were covered by US quotas on India and China. Kaplinsky and Morris (2008) and 
Na-Allah and Muchie (2010) also point out that Asian garment ﬁrms established plants in 
Africa in order to take advantage of MFA quotas. de Voest (2012) surveyed Chinese private 
ﬁrms to identify the factors leading them to invest and operate in Africa and found that taking 
advantage of international trade agreements was a top-ﬁve motive. 
What’s more, a large number of papers emphasize that the inputs of apparel ﬁrms in Africa 
were most-often Chinese. de Voest (2012) documents that the Taiwanese clothing ﬁrms in 
Lesotho imported 93% of material input from network sources in Asia where China 
constitutes the major supplier. Rolfe and Woodward (2005) ﬁnd that the local components in 
Kenyan apparel exports accounts for only 3% of the export sales value. Phelps et al. (2009) 
surveyed 23 of an estimated 35 clothing manufactures in Kenya and found that all 
companies imported the necessary fabric from their parent company located in China, Pakistan, 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Sri Lanka. This is conﬁrmed by data from the World Bank’s 
Enterprise Surveys, summarized in Table 1, which suggest 
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that most ﬁrms in the garment sector in Africa sourced their inputs from abroad. Yet there is 
also anecdotal evidence that the inputs were quasi-ﬁnished products with little work to be 
done. Edwards and Lawrence (2010) describe the experience of Lesotho ﬁrms which, 
“almost entirely foreign owned, typically provide assembly, packaging and shipping services and 
depend on their Asian headquarters to generate orders, design the clothes, and send them the 
fabric they need”. Lall (2005) also explains how East Asian ﬁrms in Lesotho had tight links 
with “full package” apparel suppliers from Hong Kong. Fernandez-Stark et al. (2011) adds that 
Taiwanese operations in Lesotho are limited to assembly and that local linkages are low, 
which is in line with the quota-hopping and footloose strategy of these ﬁrms. 
We go further than the previous literature and the anecdotal evidence by empirically tracing the 
transhipment from China to the US via AGOA. More precisely, we show that Chinese apparel 
exports to AGOA, deﬁned at the 6-digit level in the HS classiﬁcation, predict AGOA exports to 
the US, within country-product and across time.  To show that this correlation indeed captures 
transhipment, we show it only holds in countries which faced no rules of origin within the AGOA 
framework, and only for products bound by US quotas on Chinese exports. In other words, we 
ﬁnd the strongest indication of quota-hopping transhipment where incentives were highest and 
where it was legally possible to do so. This result is robust to various estimation speciﬁcations, using 
alternative deﬁnitions of quota bindingness, looking at trade volume in values as well as in quantities, 
and investigating countries individually or pooled together. As a reassuring check, we show that 
apparel exports from any of the world’s top 8 apparel exporters other than China have no 
prediction power for AGOA’s exports. 
Using the US Input-Output matrix, we then show that AGOA countries did not import 
intermediate inputs from China but rather ﬁnished products with little additional work remaining. 
This conﬁrms the role played by lax rules of origin in quota-hopping transhipment. Finally, 
using our benchmark regression result, we provide a quantitative estimate of the transhipment of 
Chinese apparel products through African exports to the US. Our calculation shows that lax 
rules of origin and quotas may be behind a sizeable share of AGOA exports, e.g. as much as 
64% of Botswana’s exports and 45% of Kenya’s. 
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Our paper is close to Edwards and Lawrence (2010) who build a theoretical model to show 
that the US quotas on Chinese exports served as an implicit subsidy for African apparel 
exporters. They argue the subsidy was greater the smaller the local value-added and was a 
greater share of overall production the lower the ﬁnal price of the product. According to their 
model, MFA quotas led AGOA countries (Lesotho in their case study) to export low value-added, 
fabric-intensive and low-priced clothing. The product selection of African exports to the US 
market was thus induced by variations in the implicit subsidies of quota. In this paper we 
argue instead that the selection was due to quota hopping by Chinese ﬁrms and that the 
absence of ROOs explains why little value was added in Africa. In turn, this explains why little 
production spillovers occurred. 
In a nutshell, our paper provides evidence on the unintended consequences of economic policies, 
here the transhipment that resulted from the combination of US quotas against China and 
preferences for Africa. This transhipment explains the surprisingly fast and robust impact 
AGOA had on apparel imports into the US even though almost no eligible countries faced import 
quotas beforehand (Frazer and Biesebroeck, 2010). As Collier and Venables (2007), we 
highlight that the absence of ROOs was key to the opening of factories in Africa, as Chinese 
production fragmented to take advantage of favorable trade preferences. This rapid rise and fall 
conﬁrms the prediction of Baldwin (2011), namely that supply-chain industrialization can lead 
to fast growth but can have limited spillovers and comes with the risk of further re-locations of 
production. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we present the empirical 
strategy. Section 3 describes the data, Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 
concludes with a discussion on policy implications. 
 
 
2 Tracing transhipment:  Empirical strategy 
 
To identify transhipment empirically, we exploit policy diﬀerences across countries, products, and 
periods. We focus on the narrowest possible comparison group, namely only on apparel 
products, only on AGOA countries, and look across the pre- and post-AGOA 
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periods, to identify as precisely as possible the eﬀect of Chinese transhipment on African exports 
to the US.2 We proceed through three main steps. First, we check whether US imports of 
apparel products from AGOA are higher from countries that are allowed to use inputs from 
third countries through a special 3rd-country-fabric rule. Indeed, when in 2001 the US granted 
AGOA beneﬁciaries duty- and quota-free access to the US for around 4,000 products including 
apparel under the AGOA “Wearing Apparel” provision,3 lesser-developed countries could beneﬁt 
from a special rule (“3rd-country fabric”) that allowed exports to enter the US without any ROOs 
on the source of fabrics or other inputs. The only requirement was for the products to be 
assembled in AGOA.4 Among AGOA countries under the “Wearing Apparel” provision, only 
Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, and South Africa faced rules of origin as they were not lesser-
developed countries. Still, rules of origin were removed for Namibia and Botswana in 2003 
and for Mauritius temporarily in 2005. 
The absence of ROOs created incentives for Chinese exporters to assemble their 
products in AGOA countries and access the US market duty-free and quota-free. While Chinese 
exporters could circumvent quota restrictions by locating in other MFA countries with unused 
quotas or in non-MFA countries paying the Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) tariﬀ, AGOA 
provided duty- and quota-free treatment and on top the 3rd-country rule allowed for the use of 
Chinese inputs, further lowering trade costs, and probably rendering the re-location of assembly 
activities economically worthwhile. We thus estimate the 
 
2We do not include the years 2009 and 2010 to avoid capturing the eﬀect of the Great Trade Collapse 
(Baldwin, 2009), as shown in Fig. 1. 
3Not all AGOA countries automatically became eligible for the “Wearing Apparel” provision. 
Countries had to be certiﬁed as having taken adequate steps to “establish eﬀective product visa systems to prevent 
illegal transhipment and the use of counterfeit documentation, as well as having instituted required enforcement 
and veriﬁcation procedures”. The products in the Apparel provision list are HS categories 61 and 62 (apparel 
and clothing, knitted or not knitted) and HS headings 6501, 6502, 6503, 6504 (hats and other headgears). 
Source: ustr.gov. Hat tip: Jo Van Biesebroeck. 
4If Chinese exporters transhipped ﬁnal apparel products without any assembly done in Africa, and 
used fake certiﬁcates of origin, they were doing something illegal. A report for the US Congress (Jones, 
2006) explains how in 2005 the US sent “Textile Production Veriﬁcation Teams” to inspect foreign 
factories. The report mentions that US producers have accused Chinese manufacturers of illegal 
transhipment particularly through countries part of AGOA. According to the US Government Accountability 
Oﬃce (GAO, 2004), investigating teams were sent to visit factories in Lesotho, Mauritius, South Africa, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Swaziland, and Botswana in 2002, visiting a quarter of all factories in the latter two countries. It 
is not mentioned, however, whether or how any case of illegal activities was detected. 
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following regression:  
USijt = β0T hirdjt + αij + γt + Eijt (1) 
 
where i indexes the HS6 apparel product line, j denotes the AGOA country, and t the 
year. The variable US collects US imports (in logs) from AGOA countries,5 while T hird is 
an indicator variable for 3rd-country-fabric eligibility. The terms αij and γt are country-product 
and year ﬁxed eﬀects to control for any possible country-product-speciﬁc shocks (e.g. local labor-
market shocks) and time shocks common to all countries and products (e.g. macro-level 
conditions aﬀecting US trade with Africa). The key parameter β0 reveals the export-creating 
eﬀect of the 3rd-country-fabric rule. The speciﬁcation in Eq. (1) is similar to the baseline 
regression of Frazer and Biesebroeck (2010, Eq. (1)), who estimate it more ﬂexibly on the 
whole list of HS6 products and countries and ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of the AGOA 
apparel provision. 
As a second step, we test whether the trade-creating eﬀects of the 3rd-country-fabric rule are 
heterogeneous across products with respect to the restrictiveness of the quotas imposed by the 
US on Chinese apparel exports. Indeed, not only were the transhipment incentives that started 
in 2001 diﬀerent across countries but they also varied across apparel products. Some 
products faced binding quotas in the US, some barely ﬁlled their quotas and others were not 
subject to any quota restrictions. If transhipment was mainly driven by quota-hopping, it is 
more likely to have occurred in products facing restrictive quotas. We thus run the following 
regression: 
 
USijt = β0F Rit + β1 (T hirdjt × F Rit) + αij + ρjt + Eijt (2) 
 
where FR is the quota ﬁll rate (i.e. the ratio of US imports from China to the US quota limit) 
for each product each year. We follow the literature on the eﬀects of the MFA (see, e.g., 
Harrigan and Barrows, 2009; Bernhofen et al., 2012) and use the ﬁll rate as a proxy for quota 
restrictiveness. The speciﬁcation includes country-product and country-year 
 
5 Both US imports from AGOA and Chinese exports to AGOA have many zero trade ﬂows (almost 95% of 
the sample for US imports from and 85% for Chinese exports to AGOA ). We add one (in thousands US$) 
to both ﬂows before taking logs. In some of the robustness checks, we take into account the implications of the 
zeros. 
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ﬁxed eﬀects, which absorb the main eﬀect of T hird.6 The inclusion of ρjt controls for 
possible shocks speciﬁc to an AGOA country and year (e.g. exchange-rate ﬂuctuations). The 
coeﬃcient on the interaction term, β1, indicates whether the 3rd-country-fabric rule 
promoted exports even more for products for which Chinese exporters faced more restrictive 
quotas. 
Finally, we bring into the picture the role of Chinese apparel exports to AGOA. We suggest 
that transhipment can be observed in the correlation between AGOA imports of apparel from 
China and exports to the US. The idea is that if transhipment occurred with little assembly 
work, the same products that were imported in the African country should be exported to the 
US.7 If this correlation indeed captures transhipment, it should be highest where transhipment 
incentives are highest, i.e. for products facing quotas in the US and in AGOA countries facing 
no rules of origin. To this end, our baseline “transhipment” regression takes the following 
form: 
 
USijt = β0F Rit + β1CHijt + β2 (T hirdjt × F Rit) + β3 (T hirdjt × CHijt)+ (3) 
+ (β4F Rit × CHijt) + β5 (T hirdjt × F Rit × CHijt) + αij + ρjt + Eijt 
 
where CH are Chinese exports (in logs) to the AGOA country j. This speciﬁcation 
interacts the estimated coeﬃcients of Eq. (2) with the level of Chinese exports to Africa, CH. 
More precisely, β1 in Eq. (2) is now linearly dependent on the level of CH. According to this 
identiﬁcation strategy, we expect to ﬁnd a positive coeﬃcient on the three-way interaction 
term, β5, if transhipment indeed occurred. This would imply the correlation between CH and 
US, which we call the “transhipment elasticity”, to be the highest in 3rd-country-fabric-
eligible countries and in products with restrictive quotas. Before turning to our results, we ﬁrst 
describe the data in the next section. 
 
6Estimations are performed using the STATA program reg2hdfe of Guimara˜es and Portugal (2010), adjusted 
for the clustering of standard errors at the product level. 
7In a further check we use the US Input-Output matrix to check for the possibility of inputs imported 
from China being correlated with inputs theoretically required to produce the apparel products exported to the US. 
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3 Data and descriptive evidence 
 
Our data set consists of all AGOA-eligible apparel products from 1996 (the ﬁrst year of the 
1996 version of HS classiﬁcation) to 2008 (the last year of US quotas on Chinese exports of 
textiles and apparel) and includes all countries that entered AGOA within this period.8 
Information on the AGOA and AGOA-Apparel accession dates by country are taken from 
AGOA.gov, cross-checked with information from AGOA.info and from the OTEXA website. 
AGOA entered into force in October 2000, so we consider 2001 its ﬁrst year. Eligibility for the 
3rd-country-fabric rule occurred in diﬀerent (daily) dates. For this study, we consider a 
country as being eligible in year t if it became so before 31st July of the same year. Eligibility 
is summarized in the top panel of Fig. 3. 
The empirical analysis requires data on US imports, Chinese exports, and quotas 
imposed by the US on apparel imports from China. In order to keep compatibility 
between US and Chinese trade data, we carry out our analysis at the 6-digit level, the most 
disaggregated and internationally comparable level of HS product classiﬁcation. The value of US 
imports (in thousand US$) is taken from the USITC website, which records the tariﬀ regime 
under which a product enters the US market. Speciﬁcally, shipments from AGOA countries 
could enter the US under AGOA (i.e. duty- and quota-free), under the 
General Scheme of Preferences (GSP) for developing countries, or under the Most-favored-
Nation (MFN) tariﬀ regime. This information allows us to identify imports that actually entered 
the US market duty-free when eligible, rather than eligibility only.9 Aggregated data for the years 
2003 to 2008 from AGOA.info conﬁrms that, conditional on exporting, preference utilization 
was high, and that almost all exports of the big apparel exporters, i.e. Kenya, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, and Swaziland, were exploiting the 3rd-country-fabric rule (Fig. 2). This again 
implies that the inputs used were neither from AGOA countries nor the US. Consequently, the US 
imports variable equals imports that 
 
8Three countries, i.e. the Central African Republic, Coˆte d’Ivoire, and Mauritania lost AGOA status during 
the period, the ﬁrst two in 2004 and the last one in 2006. None of these countries were eligible for the Apparel 
provision. Among apparel-eligible countries, only Madagascar lost its AGOA status, but in 2010. 
9Preference utilization has been an issue for exports of textile products from African countries to 
the US and the EU, the two major markets that grant preferences to those countries (see de Melo and Portugal-
Pe´rez, 2008). 
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entered under the AGOA scheme for Apparel-eligible countries and the sum of GSP and MFN 
imports for non-apparel-eligible countries.10 Data on Chinese exports to AGOA countries is 
from the UN Comtrade database. 
Quota ﬁll rates from 1996 to 2004 are from Brambilla et al. (2010) and from 2005 to 2008 
from the the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) website. Importantly, the number of 
products under quota fell dramatically in 2005 as a result of the end of the MFA. Still, in May 
2005, new temporary quotas were agreed between the US and China due to the surge of 
imports from China. This new safeguard system against Chinese textiles remained in force 
until the end of 2008. Fig. 4 gives the distribution of ﬁll rates from 2001 to 2008. Fill rates 
are available at 3-digit categories deﬁned by OTEXA and can be mapped to the US HTS10 
classiﬁcation.11 We then apply the methodology described in Bernhofen et al. (2012) to 
aggregate the ﬁll rates at the HS6 level. We follow Brambilla et al. (2010) and Harrigan and 
Barrows (2009) by considering a quota with ﬁll rate above 90% as a binding quota. Some 
apparel products were not subject to quota in a given year and thus have a zero ﬁll rate.12 For 
most products subject to a quota, the ﬁll rate was above 80%. We superpose the distributions 
at the HTS10 and HS6 level to show that aggregating at the HS6 level does not alter the original 
distribution. 
Fig. 3 maps the big exporters of apparel to the US, the big importers of Chinese 
apparel, as well as 3rd-country-fabric eligibility. US imports are mostly from a few 
countries, especially those that are eligible for the 3rd-country rule and that set up an export-
processing zone devoted to apparel and textiles, i.e. Kenya, Madagascar, Lesotho, and Swaziland. 
These same countries also receive relatively large amounts of Chinese apparel exports, 
although some other countries in West Africa, i.e. Togo, Benin, and Guinea, are also big 
importers (relative to their economic size) of Chinese apparel. 
 
 
10Imports from South Africa and Mauritius, the two apparel-eligible countries that faced rules of origin, mostly 
entered under the AGOA scheme (around 75% of their exports.) 
11See the OTEXA website for the concordance table. We follow Brambilla et al. (2010) and assign the 
same ﬁll rate to HTS 10-digit products within the same OTEXA 3-digit category. 
12There are few cases and only until 2004 where quotas were imposed but no imports from China were observed. 
We treat such product-year observations as having a zero ﬁll rate. 
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4 Results and robustness 
 
4.1 Baseline estimates 
 
The estimation results of models (1) to (3) are presented in Table 2. Columns (1) and (4) show 
that, for both trade values and quantities (dozens of items or kilograms13), eligibility for the 3rd-
country-fabric rule, by providing duty-free and ROOs-free access to the US market, increases 
signiﬁcantly apparel exports to the US, consistent with the ﬁnding of Frazer and Biesebroeck 
(2010). The diﬀerence in export growth due to this eligibility is around 15% of trade values and 
20% of trade quantities. 
Columns (2) and (5) report the estimates of model (2) which examines the role of the MFA 
quotas on top of AGOA preferences. The results show that, for countries eligible for the 3rd-
country-fabric rule, apparel exports are signiﬁcantly higher in products for which China faces 
tighter quota in the US. This conﬁrms that AGOA promoted the exports of quota-bound 
products signiﬁcantly more. 
Columns (3) and (6) contain the estimation results of model (3) which adds Chinese exports 
to AGOA, CH, into the speciﬁcation. This model allows us to estimate the “transhipment 
elasticity”, namely the correlation between Chinese exports to AGOA and US imports from 
the same AGOA country in the same product. Particularly, the three-way interaction term 
T hird × FR × CH allows the transhipment elasticity to vary along the level of quota 
bindingness of products and across countries. As expected, this triple interaction term has a 
positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient, whether we look at trade values or trade quantities. In other 
words, we only ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant correlation between US apparel imports from 
AGOA and AGOA apparel imports from China where transhipment incentives are present. Fig. 
6 graphs this key result. For both 3rd-country-rule eligible and non-eligible countries, we plot the 
transhipment elasticity, 
i.e. the marginal eﬀect of Chinese exports to AGOA on US imports from AGOA, against 
 
 
13For ease of comparison, the estimation samples for all regressions include only product/country/year 
observations where the units of quantity of US imports and Chinese exports match. After all the 
adjustments to maximize the matching of units across the diﬀerent data sources (e.g. convert dozen pairs and items 
to dozens), 2% of the sample is dropped from the estimation sample because of mismatched units. 
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the quota ﬁll rate. In countries where apparel exporters are not constrained by ROOs, the 
transhipment elasticity is positive and signiﬁcant and increases with the restrictiveness of US 
quotas on Chinese imports. In countries that are not covered by the 3rd-country-fabric rule, the 
transhipment elasticity is insigniﬁcant and does not increase with the quota ﬁll rate. 
We also estimate model (3) country by country splitting the sample into the AGOA period 
(2001-2008) and the pre-AGOA period (1996-2000). We plot the transhipment elasticities 
for quota-bound products obtained from these regressions in Fig. 5. Whether we run the 
regression using trade vales or quantities, in 3rd-country-rule countries the transhipment 
elasticity was always higher during the AGOA period, and it is especially so in the countries 
identiﬁed by Frazer and Biesebroeck (2010) as the biggest winners from AGOA apparel 
exports, namely, Kenya, Madagascar, and Lesotho. 
 
 
4.2 Robustness checks 
 
In order to exclude the possibility that our benchmark result is driven by other factors than 
transhipment, we validate the above ﬁndings through a number of robustness checks. 
Firstly, to smooth out the possible noise in the yearly quota ﬁll rate and to have constant 
treatment and control groups at the product level, we use a treatment dummy which takes the 
value of one if the 2001-2008 average of the quota ﬁll rate is greater than 90% and zero 
otherwise, as an alternative proxy for quota restrictiveness.  The treatment and control 
product groups are here constant across time. Results in Table 3 and summarized in Fig. 7 
conﬁrm the benchmark results.14  For both trade values and quantities, the transhipment 
elasticity is statistically positive only in 3rd-country-fabric eligible countries and highest for 
quota-bound products. More importantly, the double diﬀerence in the transhipment elasticity 
between quota-bound and non-bound products and between 3rd-country-fabric eligible and non-
eligible countries, which is given by the coeﬃcient on the three-way interaction term (T hird × 
Quota × CH), is positive and 
 
 
14Using an alternative and looser deﬁnition of quota bindingness, namely replacing the dummy with a one for 
any product facing a quota, does not change the results (not reported). 
13  
 
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Also, the size of the coeﬃcient is slightly larger than in Table 2, 
as the treatment dummy creates more extreme comparisons. 
A further concern with the results obtained so far may be that both trade ﬂow 
variables in our transhipment regression have many zeros (see footnote 5). This can partly 
contribute to the positive correlation of Chinese exports to and US imports from 3rd-country-
fabric eligible countries if zero trade values are prevalent among products with high quota ﬁll 
rates. To see whether this is the case, we re-run regression (3), dropping all observations 
where both US imports and Chinese exports are equal to zero. As reported in Table 4, this 
reduces the sample size by 85%. Yet, the coeﬃcient on the three-way interaction is positive 
and signiﬁcant, conﬁrming our previous ﬁndings. As a further robustness test, we convert the 
trade-ﬂow variables in dummies equal to one if we observe a positive trade ﬂow and to zero 
otherwise. Given the high dimensionality of the ﬁxed eﬀects and the number of interactive 
terms in the regression, we opt for a linear probability model. The estimates reported in 
Columns (2) and (5) validate the baseline results, showing that the probability of observing 
positive US apparel imports is signiﬁcantly higher in 3rd-country-fabric eligible countries, for 
products with positive Chinese exports and constrained by US quota. Finally, the results are 
conﬁrmed using another functional form where we add 0.001 instead of 1 (i.e. we add one 
dollar rather than one thousand dollars in the case of trade values) before taking logs of trade 
ﬂows. 
Thirdly, as a large fraction of Chinese exports are processed through Hong Kong 
(Feenstra and Hanson, 2004), it is possible that Chinese apparel aimed for transhipment come as 
Hong Kong exports, instead of Chinese exports, to Africa. To account for this possibility, in 
Columns (4) and (8) of Table 4, we re-estimate the transhipment regression 
(3) replacing Chinese exports by the sum of Chinese exports and Hong Kong re-exports. Under 
this speciﬁcation the transhipment elasticity remains positive and statistically signiﬁcant, 
conﬁrming our transhipment result. 
Fourthly, to show that the positive transhipment elasticity is unique to Chinese exports, 
we re-estimate speciﬁcation (3) by replacing Chinese exports with exports from exports from the 
largest exporters of apparel and textiles, namely Belgium, France, India, 
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Italy, South Korea, and Turkey. Results in Table 5 conﬁrm that only AGOA imports from China 
predict US imports from AGOA signiﬁcantly and positively in 3rd-country-fabric eligible 
countries and for products with high quota ﬁll rate. 
One last concern is that the correlation between US imports and Chinese exports, rather 
than capturing transhipment, captures a deﬂection of Chinese exports combined with a diversion 
of US imports, caused by MFA quotas and AGOA preferences. Indeed the two ﬂows could be 
correlated simply because AGOA countries specialized their exports in the products China 
exports. Our speciﬁcation controls for this possibility as the 3-way interaction includes a 
dummy for 3rd-country-fabric eligibility, rather than AGOA eligibility. To put it diﬀerently, for 
countries such as Mauritius and South Africa, two major African apparel producers part of 
AGOA but facing rules of origin, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant transhipment elasticity (this is also 
shown in Fig. 5). If it were simply a deﬂection-diversion result, it should have appeared in 
these countries as well. 
 
 
4.3 Size of transhipment 
 
As a byproduct of our transhipment regression (Table 2) we can simulate the level of US imports 
that would have been observed had there been rules of origin or no MFA quotas, taking everything 
else constant. This gives us counterfactual scenarios corresponding to a world where transhipment 
incentives would be lower. As per our 3-way interaction model, this scenario has heterogeneous 
eﬀects across products and countries. Our results, which should be interpreted only as back-of-the-
envelope calculations, are presented in Table 6. We ﬁnd that the 3rd-country rule may account for 
as much as 45% of Botswana’s apparel exports, 30% of Kenya’s, 22% of Madagascar’s, and 
13% of Lesotho’s. The MFA quotas account for almost similarly-large shares of exports. In South 
Africa and Mauritius, where the sourcing of inputs was subject to ROOs, quotas on Chinese 
exports seemed to have had almost no eﬀect on exports to the US. When we combine the eﬀect 
of lax ROOs with MFA quotas, we ﬁnd that these policies may account for as much as 64% of 
Botswana’s apparel exports, 45% of Kenya’s, 35% of Madagascar’s, and 23% of Lesotho’s. 
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4.4 Chinese inputs and African apparel exports 
 
The evidence so far shows that AGOA apparel imports from China are signiﬁcantly 
correlated with AGOA apparel exports to the US, and this only in 3rd-country-fabric eligible 
countries and for products that are subject to US quotas imposed on China. This gives a strong 
indication of transhipment, suggesting that the quota-hopping re-location involved only the last 
stages of the production process. This ﬁnding has important implications from a 
development perspective. Indeed, as noted in the introduction, the boom in AGOA apparel 
exports was not accompanied by dynamic growth beneﬁts and this may be because Chinese 
ﬁrms focused on the ﬁnal touches of the value chain, using quasi-ﬁnished products as inputs, 
where value added is lowest (Fernandez-Stark et al., 2011). If, on the contrary, Chinese ﬁrms 
in Africa had imported intermediate inputs from China and then processed them with 
contributions from local production factors, the transhipment may have had positive spillover 
eﬀects on the local apparel industry. 
To further conﬁrm that AGOA countries only engaged in the last steps of the production process, 
we use input-output linkages between apparel products and their textile inputs to check to which extent 
AGOA countries imported intermediate inputs from China. Since most AGOA countries lack 
detailed input-output matrices, we use the US one.15  Each HS6 apparel product is mapped to a 
production process using the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) concordance table. A 
production process consists in a set of input values needed to produce one dollar of output. We thus 
estimate the value of required inputs that would be needed to produce the AGOA exports of each 
country and year in the following way: 
Req inputhjt = 
' 
λihUSimpijt (4) 
i∈I 
where h indicates the textile input and I is the set of apparel products used in the 
regression analysis.16   The λ term quantiﬁes the amount of the textile input h that is 
 
 
15The 1997 IO Total Requirement table and the corresponding concordance tables are used in the analysis. 
16The set of textile inputs are the categories listed on the OTEXA webiste (aggregated at the HS6 
level), once the apparel products have been dropped.  We thus do not consider apparel products as possible 
inputs. 
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embedded in one dollar of the apparel product i. 
 
If Chinese exports were inputs for AGOA’s screwdriver plants, they should mimic the 
input-requirements predicted by AGOA’s exports. We thus check whether China’s exports of 
textile inputs to AGOA can be explained by the inputs predicted by the theoretical 
production process. Quite intriguingly, the results in Columns (1) to (3) of Table 7 suggest 
that required inputs are negatively correlated with Chinese exports.17 This results also hold if 
we lag Chinese exports by a year, in the case where production would involve a one-year lag 
(results not shown). It thus seems highly unlikely that textile inputs were imported from China. 
To illustrate this result graphically, we deﬁne “missing inputs” as the diﬀerence between 
“required” inputs and the actual inputs imported from China. Fig. 8 shows that in the 
countries we identiﬁed as successful apparel exporters, input imports are indeed “missing”. 
The distribution of mainly positive values suggests that Chinese textile exports to AGOA fall short 
of the inputs required by AGOA countries to produce their apparel exports to the US. This 
pattern suggests that the production process in Africa was indeed more concentrated on the 
ﬁnal assembly touches, where no textile inputs are necessary. 
 
 
5 Concluding remarks 
 
This paper has shown that the combination of restrictive quotas on Chinese apparel exports 
in the US and preferential treatment for African exports resulted in quota-hopping transhipment 
from China to the US via AGOA countries. As highlighted by Brambilla et al. (2010), the MFA 
resulted in a regime which guaranteed smaller developing countries access to the US market. 
Coupled with AGOA, the incentives of the quotas were strong enough to spur a new trade 
route, despite the poor infrastructure, high risk, and poor public services associated with 
African countries, as noted by Frazer and Biesebroeck 
(2010). In terms of policy implications, this paper sheds light on the unintended consequences 
 
 
17The regressions in Columns (4) to (6), which conﬁrm those of (1) to (3), are done when considering only 
exports of quota-bound products to the US 
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of regulation on the organization of international trade. The success of African apparel exports 
conﬁrms that supply-chain industrialization can lead to fast exports growth, as suggested by 
Baldwin (2011). Still, this success may have been ephemeral due to the distortive 
“loopholes” in global trade policies that created an artiﬁcially-proﬁtable fragmentation of 
production. Hence, trade and development policies should be designed more carefully to mitigate 
ﬁckle ﬁrm re-locations. 
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Table 1: Foreign sourcing and export in the garment industry in Africa 
 Year % of ﬁrms 
using supplies of 
foreign origin 
% of total 
inputs that are of 
foreign origin 
% of ﬁrms 
exporting directly 
or indirectly 
Botswana 2005 80.5 62.0 23.6 
Ghana 2006 67.7 37.9 44.2 
Kenya 2006 55.8 31.8 28.5 
Madagascar 2008 78.9 62.8 78.7 
Mauritius 2008 42.2 31.8 40.3 
Swaziland 2005 74.4 62.2 80.7 
Tanzania 2005 57.4 38.5 5.7 
South Africa 2006 35.3 15.8 22.1 
Note: Data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys. Number for South Africa is for 
the sector: Textiles, Garments, Leather, Paper and Publishing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Transhipment regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Values   Quantities  
Third 0.158***   0.214***   
 (0.0259)   (0.0378)   
FR  -0.0250* -0.0228*  -0.0356* -0.0309* 
  (0.0140) (0.0126)  (0.0202) (0.0183) 
Third × FR  0.216*** 
(0.0512) 
0.144*** 
(0.0363) 
 0.297*** 
(0.0724) 
0.197*** 
(0.0503) 
CH   -0.0124**   -0.00567 
   (0.00618)   (0.00367) 
FR × CH   0.00520   0.00217 
   (0.00991)   (0.00637) 
Third × CH   0.0226** 
(0.0102) 
  0.0137* 
(0.00741) 
Third × FR × CH   0.0627** 
(0.0279) 
  0.0416** 
(0.0206) 
Obs 140,246 140,246 140,246 140,246 140,246 140,246 
R2 0.659 0.680 0.682 0.633 0.655 0.656 
Note: Columns (1) and (4) include country-product and year ﬁxed eﬀects, all other regressions include 
country-product and country-year ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors clustered at the product level. 
*** signiﬁcant at 1%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, * signiﬁcant at 10%. 
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Table 3: Transhipment regression with treatment dummy 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Values Quantities 
Third × Quota 0.384*** 
(0.125) 
0.232** 
(0.0915) 
0.543*** 
(0.181) 
0.337** 
(0.136) 
CH  -0.000318  0.00291 
  (0.00418)  (0.00256) 
Quota × CH  -0.0168* 
(0.00941) 
 -0.0170** 
(0.00688) 
Third × CH  0.0242** 
(0.0116) 
 0.0137* 
(0.00823) 
Third × Quota × CH  0.0865** 
(0.0374) 
 0.0582** 
(0.0288) 
Obs 140,246 140,246 140,246 140,246 
R2 0.681 0.683 0.656 0.657 
Note: Quota equals one if the average quota ﬁll rate over the 2001-2008 period is greater or equal 
to 0.9, zero otherwise. All regressions include country-year and country-product ﬁxed eﬀects. 
Standard errors clustered at the product level. 
*** signiﬁcant at 1%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, * signiﬁcant at 10%. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  Table 4: Some Robustness checks   
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Values    Quantities   
No double LPM +0.001 HK re-exp No double LPM +0.001 HK re-exp 
zero    zero    
FR 0.129* 9.63e-05 0.0129 -0.0241** 0.554*** 0.000342 -0.000175 -0.0339* 
 (0.0700) (0.00277) (0.0613) (0.0119) (0.145) (0.00277) (0.0569) (0.0176) 
Third × FR 0.0635 0.0117** 0.509*** 0.127*** -0.0873 0.0119** 0.517*** 0.179*** 
 (0.131) (0.00533) (0.162) (0.0319) (0.234) (0.00531) (0.156) (0.0444) 
CH -0.0547*** -0.00557* -0.00572 -0.0134** -0.114*** -0.00577* -0.00407 -0.00574* 
 (0.0142) (0.00321) (0.00436) (0.00606) (0.0178) (0.00318) (0.00344) (0.00319) 
FR × CH -0.0402** 0.00408*** 0.00389 0.0109 -0.0889*** 0.00165*** 0.00297 0.00641 
 (0.0183) (0.00122) (0.00729) (0.00783) (0.0200) (0.000561) (0.00593) (0.00446) 
Third × CH -0.00191 0.00603 0.0113 0.0235** 0.000946 0.00593 0.00848 0.0121* 
 (0.0267) (0.00704) (0.00777) (0.00963) (0.0248) (0.00739) (0.00696) (0.00678) 
Third × FR × CH 0.0843** 0.0193* 0.0418** 0.0589*** 0.0823** 0.0208* 0.0352** 0.0396** 
 (0.0362) (0.0117) (0.0200) (0.0226) (0.0345) (0.0124) (0.0173) (0.0167) 
Obs 23,553 140,069 140,246 140,069 23,553 140,069 140,246 140,069 
R2 0.831 0.535 0.622 0.682 0.832 0.535 0.612 0.656 
Note: All regressions include country-product and country-year ﬁxed eﬀects. In Columns (2) and (6), the dependent variable is a dummy 
equal to one if we observe non-zero US imports, and the variable CH is a dummy equal to one if we observe Chinese exports. In Columns (3) 
and (7), we add 0.001 to US imports before taking logs. Standard errors clustered at the product level. 
*** signiﬁcant at 1%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, * signiﬁcant at 10%. 
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  Table 5: RoW Falsiﬁcation test   
 
 Values Quantities Values Quantities Values Quantities Values Quantities Values Quantities Values Quantities 
FR -0.0256* -0.0363* -0.0346** -0.0471** -0.0303** -0.0431** -0.0296** -0.0401** -0.0217 -0.0310 -0.0214 -0.0299 
 (0.0135) (0.0195) (0.0145) (0.0213) (0.0136) (0.0195) (0.0136) (0.0198) (0.0134) (0.0193) (0.0137) (0.0195) 
CH -0.0429* -0.0306 -0.0315* -0.0123 -0.0403** -0.0127 -0.0217* -0.0126 0.00802 0.0135 -0.00353 0.00555 
 (0.0247) (0.0219) (0.0164) (0.0119) (0.0190) (0.0132) (0.0118) (0.0132) (0.00797) (0.0117) (0.00961) (0.00808) 
Third × FR 0.221*** 0.304*** 0.249*** 0.345*** 0.229*** 0.310*** 0.224*** 0.309*** 0.201*** 0.276*** 0.220*** 0.306*** 
 (0.0499) (0.0704) (0.0535) (0.0752) (0.0510) (0.0703) (0.0500) (0.0697) (0.0454) (0.0637) (0.0477) (0.0664) 
FR × CH 0.0387 0.0318 0.0523** 0.0401** 0.0526** 0.0312* 0.0257 0.0177 0.0297** 0.00733 -0.0465*** -0.0372*** 
 (0.0286) (0.0257) (0.0258) (0.0188) (0.0229) (0.0169) (0.0162) (0.0178) (0.0135) (0.0121) (0.0177) (0.0140) 
Third × CH 0.219** 0.111* 0.0276 0.0152 -0.0188 -0.0377* -0.0303 -0.0364 0.0459* 0.00798 0.00526 -0.0314 
 (0.0932) (0.0610) (0.0199) (0.0220) (0.0237) (0.0218) (0.0256) (0.0225) (0.0264) (0.0217) (0.0297) (0.0298) 
Third × FR × CH -0.232** -0.133* -0.0624** -0.0539 0.0511 0.0540 0.0140 0.0247 0.00643 0.0254 0.0360 0.0425 
 (0.105) (0.0755) (0.0301) (0.0330) (0.0524) (0.0390) (0.0450) (0.0426) (0.0387) (0.0312) (0.0510) (0.0363) 
Obs 137,384 137,384 116,014 116,014 127,582 127,582 118,366 118,366 135,308 135,308 132,312 132,312 
R2 0.677 0.652 0.679 0.657 0.684 0.658 0.689 0.666 0.684 0.659 0.689 0.666 
All regressions included country-product and country-year ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors clustered at the product level. *** signiﬁcant at 1%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, * signiﬁcant at 10%. 
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Table 6: What share of US imports is Made in China? 
 Exports 
($ ’000) 
Share due to 
3rd-country rule 
Share due to 
MFA quotas 
Share due to 
MFA and 3rd rule 
Botswana 139490 45% 38% 64% 
Ethiopia 30836 30% 25% 45% 
Kenya 1636288 30% 24% 45% 
Lesotho 2758955 13% 11% 23% 
Madagascar 1730829 22% 18% 35% 
Mozambique 9678 24% 20% 37% 
Mauritius 888118 3% 1% 4% 
Malawi 140929 17% 14% 28% 
Namibia 226295 15% 13% 25% 
Tanzania 15619 31% 25% 46% 
Uganda 15066 38% 32% 55% 
South Africa 499783 0% 2% 2% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Do AGOA countries import the required inputs from China? 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Inputs required for all US imports Inputs required for quota-bound US imports 
Required inputs -0.0359*** 
(0.00820) 
-0.0361*** 
(0.0104) 
-0.0400*** 
(0.0136) 
-0.0351*** 
(0.00807) 
-0.0354*** 
(0.0103) 
-0.0392*** 
(0.0134) 
Required inputs × Third  0.000444 -0.00969  0.000554 -0.00974 
  (0.0152) (0.00815)  (0.0153) (0.00813) 
Required inputs × Pre-AGOA   0.0125   0.0126 
   (0.0140)   (0.0142) 
Obs 230,784 230,784 230,784 230,784 230,784 230,784 
R2 0.710 0.710 0.710 0.710 0.710 0.710 
All regressions included country-product and country-year ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors clustered at the product level. 
*** signiﬁcant at 1%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, * signiﬁcant at 10%. 
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Figure 1 Rise and fall of AGOA apparel exports to the US 
 
AGOA apparel exports to the EU 
 
 
Note: Kenya, Madagascar and Lesotho were the three biggest exporters of apparel to the US 
among AGOA countries during 2000-2004. AGOA started in October 2000 and the MFA 
ended on 1 Jan 2005. 
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Figure 2 US apparel imports from the top 10 AGOA countries (2003-2008) 
 
 
Note: Data from agoa.info available from 2003 onwards only. 
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Figure 3 AGOA 3rd-country rule eligibility, US imports, and Chinese export 
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Figure 4 Distribution of US quota ﬁll rates on Chinese apparel products 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Transhipment elasticities 
 
30  
 
Figure 6 Transhipment elasticity vs. quota ﬁll rate 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 Transhipment elasticities: Across product and country groups 
 
31  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 Missing-inputs distributions 
 
